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INTRODUCTION
In Reimagining Equality: A New Deal for Children of Color,
Professor Nancy Dowd makes a powerful case for attacking
inequalities and hierarchies among children at their roots. She
reimagines equality against the backdrop of the United States. As the
book’s title emphasizes, it is framed within a context of U.S. domestic
history and culture, U.S. movements for social reform, U.S. political
structures, and U.S. constitutional doctrine. This is as it should be,
because context is essential. In using the case of black boys in the
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United States as her example, she shows how hierarchies of race,
gender, and class are established even before birth and how
entrenched subordination and discrimination operate to block the
development of black boys, depriving them of a fair start. She argues
that these burdens and barriers to maximizing the development of all
children must be removed if we are to achieve true equality.
Moreover, she calls for a comprehensive approach of intersecting
programs to provide the supports that children need to enjoy true
developmental equality. In her introduction to this issue of the
Fordham Urban Law Journal, “Children’s Equality: the Centrality of
Race, Gender and Class,” Professor Dowd highlights several
questions that remain to be “explored, discussed and debated” in
moving forward on the goal of achieving genuine equality among
children. In this Essay, I will explore some of these questions in a
different context, drawing upon a different framework: the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).1
The CRC is a comprehensive charter of children’s rights. It is also
the most rapidly and universally endorsed human rights charter in the
history of international law. Opened for signature in 1989, the CRC
entered into force in 1990 and has been ratified by every nation in the
world with one glaring exception — the United States.2 The CRC
begins from the baseline that children are entitled to all of the human
rights of adult persons as recognized in international law.3 It adds
additional rights and protections flowing from the unique needs of the
developing child, defined as any person below age eighteen.4 While it
is relatively unknown in the United States, the CRC is routinely
applied by the highest courts in our peer nations.5 Because all of the
member nations of the European Union are states parties, the CRC is
foundational to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human

1. G.A. Res. 44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989).
2. United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter IV Human Rights: 11. Convention
on the Rights of the Child (updated Apr. 11, 2019),
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV11.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/E94S-EJMF].
3. See G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 1, at Preamble.
4. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS LAW (Jonathan Todres &
Shani M. King eds., forthcoming Feb. 2020); G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 1, Art. 1.
5. CHILD RIGHTS INT’L NETWORK, REALISING RIGHTS? THE UN CONVENTION
RIGHTS
OF
THE
CHILD
IN
COURT
10
(2019),
ON
THE
https://archive.crin.org/sites/default/files/uncrc_in_court.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C62JS4E] (collecting cases involving the CRC from courts around the world between
2009 and 2017 and noting that courts apply the CRC directly in approximately 25% of
cases and in 60% use it as an interpretative guide).
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Rights in Strasbourg, France.6 It has inspired children’s rights
provisions in numerous modern constitutions, including that of the
Republic of South Africa.7 The CRC’s approach to rights is markedly
different from that of the U.S. Constitution, at least as currently
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. Yet it provides a valuable
comparative perspective on how to move forward on the goal of
reaching true developmental equality.
Dowd’s introduction to this special issue, in its final section, points
out five concerns, each of which I will address and respond to in this
Essay.8 The first is about the danger of universalizing the model
rather than concentrating on children of color. My response will
explore universality as an opportunity rather than a threat and
describe the role of the human rights principles of indivisibility and
interdependence of rights in mitigating the dangers of universalizing.
The second and third points relate to the dangers of incrementalism
and the challenge of establishing benchmarks for funding. I will draw
upon the CRC to illustrate ways to justify and define appropriate
levels of funding. The fourth point asks whether the “intrusive state”
of contemporary family policy can be transformed into the
“responsive state” required by her model. I will illustrate with
examples from the European experience of how human rights
principles can promote a responsive model of state engagement. The
fifth point is about overcoming the public/private dichotomy that
distorts current family policies in the United States. I will use the
principles of the CRC to challenge the privatization of responsibility
for children as a violation of children’s human rights. The CRC
provides useful insights for avoiding the pitfalls Dowd identifies.
Most importantly, it provides affirmation on a global scale that a
developmental approach is essential to the full achievement of
children’s rights.

6. EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS & COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN LAW RELATING TO THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
26 (2015) (“The fact that all EU and COE member states are parties to the CRC
gives the CRC important standing at the European level. It effectively imposes
common legal obligations on European states with a knock-on effect on the way
European institutions develop and apply children’s rights.”). For an example of
application of the CRC by the European Court of Human Rights, see Maslov v.
Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 1638/03 (2008) (utilizing CRC definition of best interest of
the child in deportation case).
7. Barbara B. Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of Children’s Rights:
Incorporating Emerging Human Rights into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1, 37 (1999) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Constitutionalization].
8. Nancy E. Dowd, Children’s Equality: The Centrality of Race, Gender, and
Class, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 231, 249–51 (2020).
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I. UNIVERSALITY: THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY
Dowd begins with a warning against universalizing her model:
“First, it is critical to sustain the focus on racial equality. This is a
model built on the problems and issues of children of color,
specifically Black boys. They should remain ‘front and center’ and
not be lost in a ‘universal’ model.”9 I can fully understand this
concern. In the United States, our shameful and continuing history of
racial oppression makes it imperative to keep children of color at the
forefront. However, Dowd’s model, although anchored in our history
of racism, cries out to be universalized to other international and local
contexts.
Wherever groups of children are marginalized and
excluded, the lessons of her model apply. The developmental harms
and developmental realities are the same. Discrimination blights the
lives of Roma children in Europe, Muslim children in China, Catholic
children in Northern Ireland, Dalit children in India, and Tutsi
children in Rwanda.10 Differences of gender, religion, ethnicity, and
physical or mental disability, often perceived rather than real, make
them “children of a lesser God.”11 In many places, including the
United States, indigenous and refugee children are targeted for
exclusion, subordination, and forcible assimilation.12 On a global and

9. Id. at 248.
10. Ed Cairns et al., Psychology’s Contribution to Understanding Conflict in
Northern Ireland, 1 PEACE & CONFLICT: J. PEACE PSYCHOL. 131, 133 (1995); Dalit
Children in India — Victims of Caste Discrimination, INT’L DALIT SOLIDARITY
NETWORK,
https://idsn.org/wpcontent/uploads/user_folder/pdf/New_files/India/Dalit_children_in_India__victims_of_caste_discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SQB-Q3YA] (last visited
Nov. 11, 2019); Roma Children, UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org/eca/what-wedo/ending-child-poverty/roma-children [https://perma.cc/Q77L-C6YE] (last visited
Jan. 20, 2020); Emmanuel Sehene Ruvugiro, Rwanda: The Gruesome Plight of
Children During the Tutsi Genocide, JUSTICEINFO.NET (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/ictr/34925-online-exhibition-pays-gruesometribute-to-child-suffering-in-rwandan-genocide.html [https://perma.cc/KVQ3-68JG];
John Sudworth, China Muslims: Xinjiang Schools Used to Separate Children from
Families, BBC NEWS (July 4, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china48825090 [https://perma.cc/7BJ5-SARE].
11. “Children of a Lesser God” is an American play by Mark Medoff. The title,
taken from Alfred Lord Tennyson’s epic poem “Idylls of the King,” refers to children
who because of accidents of birth are stigmatized as inferior. What Does the Phrase
Children of a Lesser God Mean?, QUORA, https://www.quora.com/What-does-thephrase-children-of-a-lesser-god-mean [https://perma.cc/W3QW-L44H] (last visited
Nov. 19, 2019).
12. UNICEF, OFFICE OF RESEARCH — INNOCENTI, “NO MOTHER WANTS HER
CHILD TO MIGRATE” 38–55 (2019), https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/ChildMigration-Horn-of-Africa-part-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5XPU-644E]
(describing
discrimination against migrant and refugee children in Europe).
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even a national level, embracing a “universal model” should
strengthen rather than dilute the power of the developmental equality
approach.13
The universalizing process of human rights law enhances, rather
than undercuts, the power of the specific.14 The CRC, while it is
universal in application, addresses the specific needs of different
groups of children in the specific contexts and environments in which
they are embedded.15 There is no hierarchy of rights and no right
trumps another, although different situations may call for balancing
and harmonization.16
The CRC’s overarching antidiscrimination provision is stated in
Article 2:
1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the
present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without
discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or his or her
parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national, ethnic, or social origin, property,
disability, birth or other status.
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that
the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or
punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions,
or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal guardians, or family
members.17

Not only are all forms of discrimination prohibited; the child is also
protected against discrimination with regard to any of the other rights
set forth in the CRC. These rights include:

13. NANCY E. DOWD, REIMAGINING EQUALITY: A NEW DEAL FOR CHILDREN OF
COLOR 53–65 (2018).
14. Human rights are the ozone layer of the law. BARBARA BENNETT
WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS FROM
BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE (2008) [hereinafter, WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN]. The
making of human rights law involves an interactive and evolutionary process in which
a consensus forms that certain values are fundamental to human dignity and their
contours gain specificity through negotiation, ratification and application of universal
values in different local and global contexts. See The Foundation of International
Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/sections/universaldeclaration/foundation-international-human-rights-law/index.html
[https://perma.cc/L3BB-A6K6] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
15. BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, THE ECOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD: HOW OUR
CHANGING WORLD THREATENS CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 211 (2020) [hereinafter,
WOODHOUSE, ECOLOGY].
16. Id. at 220.
17. See G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 1, at Art. 2.
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the right to survival and development;18



the right to a name and to acquire a nationality and to be cared
for by one’s parents;19



the right to identity and family relations;20



the right to family integrity and family reunification;21



the rights to a voice in matters affecting the child and to
participation in judicial or administrative proceedings,22



the rights of freedom of religion, conscience, expression and
association;23



the right to protection from maltreatment, neglect, or abuse;24



the right to be protected from unlawful invasions of personal and
family privacy and assaults on honor and reputation;25



the rights of refugee children “to receive appropriate protection
and humanitarian assistance”;26



special care and assistance for children with disabilities;27



the right to the highest attainable standard of health;28



the right to enjoy a standard of living adequate for the child’s
physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development;29



the right to education aimed at equality of opportunity;30



the right to practice one’s own culture and religion and to speak
one’s own language regardless of minority status;31



the right to play and leisure;32



the right to be protected from economic or sexual exploitation;33

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at Art. 6.
Id. at Art. 7.
Id. at Art. 8.
Id. at Arts. 9–10.
Id. at Art. 12.
Id. at Arts. 9, 12–15.
Id. at Arts. 19, 34.
Id. at Art. 16.
Id. at Art. 22.
Id. at Art. 23.
Id. at Art. 24.
Id. at Art. 27.
Id. at Arts. 28–29.
Id. at Art. 30.
Id. at Art. 31.
Id. at Arts. 32. 34.
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the right to protection from cruel, degrading or inhumane
treatment;34 and



the right to fair treatment and rehabilitation for children accused
of crimes.35

This inventory of the rights protected by the CRC is more than a
list of disconnected concepts. The CRC provides a developmentally
and morally coherent catalog of what all children need in order to
reach their full potential. How can there be true equality when a class
of children is denied the right to an adequate standard of living or an
education that opens the doors to opportunity? How can a class of
children ever achieve true equality if they are deprived of the right to
a family or the right to health care? As Dowd’s book so beautifully
illustrates, violations of children’s rights to equal dignity and
protection from discrimination implicate every aspect of a developing
child’s life.36 Systemic inequalities in access to or enjoyment of any of
the rights listed above reverberate throughout the entire ecology of
childhood, often condemning children to a lifetime of inequality.37
II. INDIVISIBILITY AND INTERDEPENDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
As I explain in my book The Ecology of Childhood: How Our
Changing World Threatens Children’s Rights, a basic principle of

human rights is that rights are “interdependent
Experts on human rights have written thousands
and discussing the exact meaning and application
But for our purposes, it is enough to know that
bedrock feature of all human rights charters.
UNICEF:

and indivisible.”38
of pages debating
of this principle.39
this principle is a
As explained by

Human rights are indivisible. Whether civil, political, economic,
social or cultural in nature, they are all inherent to the dignity of
every human person. Consequently, they all have equal status as
rights. There is no such thing as a ‘small’ right. There is no hierarchy
of human rights. . . . The realization of one right often depends,
wholly or in part, upon the realization of others. For instance, the

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at Art. 37.
Id. at Art. 40.
DOWD, supra note 13, at 79–94.
WOODHOUSE, ECOLOGY, supra note 15, at 220–21.
James Nickel, Rethinking Indivisibility: Towards a Theory of Supporting
Relations Between Human Rights, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 984, 985 (2008).
39. DANIEL J. WHELAN, INDIVISIBLE HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY 1 (2010); James
Nickel, The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical Perspectives on Its
Scope and Justification, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 281, 281–95 (1993).
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realization of the right to health may depend on the realization of
the right to education or of the right to information.40

Attempts to vindicate one right of the child while ignoring the
interdependency of rights can lead to tragic unanticipated
consequences. In one famous example, a bill introduced by U.S.
Congressman Tom Harkin to ban importation of goods produced by
child labor resulted in Bangladesh garment manufacturers laying off
an estimated 50,000 child laborers. A study by UNICEF documented
that many of these children were forced into far more dangerous
work — including crime and prostitution — in order to survive.41 As
this example illustrates, the rights to leisure, protection from
exploitation, and education can have little practical significance to a
child growing up in a family struggling to put food on the table and a
roof over their heads. The reality for such children and their parents
is stark: in order to survive, every member of the family must work.
Especially when it comes to children, we cannot treat economic
and social rights as separate and independent from civil rights. The
myths of rugged individualism fall apart when applied to children.
Babies cannot be expected to “pull themselves up by their
bootstraps” before they have learned to walk.42 And “it’s hard to
tighten your belt when you are wearing diapers.”43 The child’s right
to survival is integrally related to her rights to access food and shelter.
Her right to healthy development is integrally related to her rights to
family, play, identity, and protection from abuse. Children’s rights
must be regarded as a fabric of interwoven threads that stabilize and
strengthen the whole.

40. What Are Human Rights?, UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org/child-rightsconvention/what-are-human-rights [https://perma.cc/8LQ7-JR55] (last visited Jan. 29,
2020); WOODHOUSE, ECOLOGY, supra note 15, at 220.
41. Zehra F. Arat, Analyzing Child Labor as a Human Right: Its Causes,
Aggravating Policies, and Alternative Proposals, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 177, 179 n.8, 199
(describing the unintended consequences of the 1993 Child Labor Deterrence Act)
(Citing to UNICEF, THE STATE OF WORLD’S CHILDREN 1997 24–25 (1997) (regarding
the developmental impacts of child labor)).
42. “‘Pull yourself up by your bootstraps.’ It’s a common phrase in American
political discourse, particularly present in conservative rhetoric about self-reliance.
The concept is simple: To pull yourself up by your bootstraps means to succeed or
elevate yourself without any outside help.” Caroline Bologna, Why the Phrase ‘Pull
Yourself up by Your Boostraps’ Is Nonsense, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 19, 2018),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/pull-yourself-up-by-your-bootstrapsnonsense_n_5b1ed024e4b0bbb7a0e037d4 [https://perma.cc/6K7M-CR7Q].
43. This slogan comes from a black and white Children’s Defense Fund poster
circa 1985 depicting a crying baby in diapers that decorated the wall of my first law
school office; the poster was reduced to tatters as I moved from office to office, but
the axiom still holds true.
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This principle of the indivisibility and interdependency of rights
may seem alien to lawyers trained in U.S. constitutional law. One of
the peculiarities of our constitutional jurisprudence is its insistence on
dividing rights into discrete categories that are then micromanaged
through the application of distinct and separate tests. In my classes
on U.S. constitutional law, I teach my students to be very careful in
framing a claim. The Supreme Court has adopted different tests
based on whether a right is framed as an equality right or a
fundamental right. I use an example from the Civil Rights movement
as Exhibit A for driving home the importance to my students of
mastering these constitutional tests and understanding their strategic
limitations.
When advocates for equality challenged racial
segregation of public swimming pools, the federal courts ruled that
the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause required that public
pools be open to all regardless of color.44 Many cities simply closed
their public pools.45 Equality problem solved: all children, white and
black, were treated equally badly by being deprived of access to
public swimming pools. Of course, we all know (as did the jurists who
drew these lines) that affluent white children had many other
options.46 When pools and schools were closed, private swim clubs,
country clubs, and the notorious “segregation academies” quickly
took their place. These alternatives were open to the affluent, for a
price, and sufficiently “private” to continue discriminating against
children of color.47
As this example illustrates, advocates for children’s rights in the
U.S. are forced to maneuver within some very strange and arbitrary
boundaries. But in seeking to reform our constitutional doctrines, we
can and should borrow insights from modern constitutions of other
countries and from human rights charters that treat rights more
holistically.

44. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
45. John A. Kirk, Going Off the Deep End: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Desegregation of Little Rock’s Public Swimming Pools, 73 ARK. HIST. Q. 138, 149–50
(2014) (discussing the closing of public pools by officials in Little Rock, Arkansas,
following attempts by civil rights leaders to integrate the facilities in advance of
expected passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
46. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 223–25.
47. Marilyn Grady & Sharon C. Hoffman, Segregation Academies Then and
School Choice Configurations Today in Deep South States, 2 CONTEMP. ISSUES
EDUC. LEADERSHIP 1, 5–6 (2018).
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III. INCREMENTALISM VERSUS MAXIMIZATION
Professor Dowd’s second and third points concern the tensions
between maximization and incrementalism. In her second point she
asks: “[I]n addition to preventing the erasure of race, how can radical
change be sustained,” and “domestication” avoided, “meaning a less
comprehensive or watered down version of the New Deal.”48 She
cites the current enthusiasm for early childhood policies among
presidential candidates as an example of the danger of sacrificing the
big picture in order to achieve incremental change in one area.
Her third point is closely related: “[A]s a theoretical, constitutional
argument, or policy argument, it is important to solidify justifying
maximum support (development to every child’s capacity) versus a
minimum or adequate level. This is a domestication danger tied to
arguments over resources that lead to sustaining hierarchy.”49 This
question poses matters of strategy as well as matters of theory and is
closely related to the question, discussed below, of “How much is
enough?”
In these two points, Dowd raises important questions that are
fundamental to any movement for social change. Strategies of
incrementalism can result in damaging capitulation, and strategies of
maximization can result in damaging backlash and failure.50 Dowd’s
concern about the domestication danger of incremental change and
her use of the phrase “minimum or adequate”51 calls to mind the
continuing struggle to define and implement equality rights for
children with disabilities.52 The movement was still celebrating a
major victory in Congress when it suffered a major defeat at the
Supreme Court, in the landmark 1982 Supreme Court case of Board
of Education v. Rowley.53 The Rowley case was the first from the

48. Dowd, supra note 8, at 249.
49. Id. at 249–50.
50. The history of social justice movements for racial equality and their defeats in
legislatures and the courts is one example of this danger. Cases like Dred Scott, 60
U.S. 393 (1857), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), marked dramatic
setbacks for the abolition and desegregation movements. Cases like Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872), and Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875), denying
women the right to practice law and vote, delayed the progress of women’s rights for
decades. As a law clerk in the mid 1980s, I recall how the Court’s ruling in Bowers v.
Hardwicke, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), became a roadblock that took almost 20 years to
dismantle. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
393 (1857).
51. Dowd, supra note 8, at 249–50.
52. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192–94 (1982).
53. 458 U.S. 176.
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Supreme Court to interpret the newly enacted Education for All
Handicapped Children Act.54 Ten-year-old Amy Rowley was born
with a severe hearing impairment, and her parents were also hearing
impaired. Cliff and Nancy Rowley had been educated at Gallaudet
and were fluent in American Sign Language (ASL). Knowing how
important sign language had been to their own intellectual
development, Amy’s parents fought hard to ensure her not just the
free public education to which she was entitled under the new law but
one that would equip her to achieve her full potential.55 Initially, a
sign language interpreter had been part of her IEP (Individualized
Education Program).56 However, the Hendrik Hudson School
District discontinued her classroom sign language interpreter, and
substituted in her place a very loud hearing aid. The school board
argued that the expense of a sign language interpreter was excessive
since Amy was learning enough to pass from one grade to the next.57
Although Amy missed most of what was taking place in the
classroom, the school board fought Amy’s case all the way to the
Supreme Court. The school lost in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York and again in the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit because it was clear from the evidence that Amy
was performing far below her natural potential in merely passing
from grade to grade.58 The Supreme Court, in a five to three
decision, reversed the lower courts and held that Amy was “receiving
an ‘adequate’ education, since she performs better than the average
child in her class and is advancing easily from grade to grade” while
also receiving “personalized instruction and related services
calculated by . . . school administrators to meet her educational
needs.59 In other words, as long as Amy was receiving “some
benefit,” she was not being denied her statutory right to a free

54. Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 (1975).
55. Amy’s case drew massive media coverage, not only because it involved an
appealing story about a spunky child but also because it was the first oral argument in
the history of the Supreme Court by a hearing-impaired lawyer relying on computer
technology to translate the spoken word into writing.
56. “The term ‘individualized education program’ or ‘IEP’ means a written
statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in
accordance with section 1414(d) of this title.” Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(14).
57. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185.
58. Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist., 632 F.2d 945,
953 (2d Cir. 1980); Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist.,
483 F. Supp. 528, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
59. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209–10 (quoting Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 534).
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appropriate public education.60 Justice White, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, lodged an acerbic dissent:
It would apparently satisfy the Court’s standard of “access to
specialized instruction and related services which are individually
designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child,”
for a deaf child such as Amy to be given a teacher with a loud voice,
for she would benefit from that service. The Act requires more. It
defines “special education” to mean “specifically designed
instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique
needs of a handicapped child.”61

The Rowley case exemplifies what can happen when a
revolutionary statute designed to maximize every child’s capacity gets
into the hands of skeptics with resource concerns. We can draft
legislative proposals but what happens next depends on federal and
state legislatures, governors and presidents, state and federal
agencies, the judiciary, and countless other players.
IV. HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?
There is a lot of space between “minimum or adequate” and
“excessive.” “How much is enough” when it comes to resource
allocation appears in many guises. There is no way to escape this
question; “maximization” is a strategy, not a metric. When the
question is “how much can we afford to spend on children?,” the
CRC provides an answer that depends on who is asking the question.
This answer makes a lot of sense and should prevail in disputes about
the allocation of resources in any nation, especially one as rich as the
United States.
CRC Article 4 provides:
States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative,
administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the
rights recognized in the present Convention. With regard to
economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties shall undertake
such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources
and, where needed, within the framework of international cooperation.62

The basis in law and tradition of this standard is obvious. When
determining what level of parental support is appropriate for

60. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 211 (White, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 215 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25) (1975)).
62. See G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 1, at Art. 4 (emphasis added).
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children, family courts look at the resources of the parent.63 Dowd’s
New Deal is premised on the belief that all children are “our own”
and that “we the people” through our government have a moral
obligation to all of our nation’s children.64
Constitutional scholars would reply that, in contrast to the CRC
and other human rights documents, the U.S. Constitution has been
interpreted as a charter of “negative rights” — rights to be free from
government interference.65 They would argue that it does not protect
“positive” or “economic, social and cultural rights.”66 This Essay
argues that we must push back against this narrow interpretation of
the rights protected by our Constitution. As Dowd’s book makes
clear, the boundary between positive and negative rights is difficult to
defend analytically, since a failure on the part of the state to take
positive action to correct abuses and address inequalities is
tantamount to action. To the extent the state has responsibility for
children’s welfare, state inaction must be recognized as a form of
neglect. In cases like Deshaney v. Winnebago County, the Court has
limited the state’s responsibility for children to situations in which the
child is actually in state custody.67 Even accepting the validity of the
divide between public and private responsibility (which I will
challenge in my subsequent remarks in Part VII), the question of
“how much is enough” cannot be sidestepped. It is inherent to
interpretation of congressional intent in statutory programs like the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act at issue in Rowley. The
question there was how to interpret the statutory mandate to provide
“specialized instruction and related services which are individually
designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.”68
The Court rejected the more individualized, maximizing approach
that had been endorsed by the district and appellate courts and held

63. The various models for computing child support all start with examination of
the parent or parents’ financial resources. Child Support Guideline Models by State,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 20, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/humanservices/guideline-models-by-state.aspx [https://perma.cc/A8P5-WEAK].
64. Dowd, supra note 8, at 241–42.
65. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.).
66. See WOODHOUSE, ECOLOGY, supra note 15, at 220–22; see also Cecile Fabre,
Constitutionalizing Social Rights, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 219, 263 (1998).
67. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989)
(“[A] State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not
constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.”). The DeShaney Court recognized
that the state may have a constitutional duty to protect a child from harm “when the
State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it
renders him unable to care for himself.” Id. at 199–200.
68. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982).
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instead that merely passing from grade to grade was an adequate
measure of “educational benefit.”69
But Amy’s story did not end with this defeat. When I clerked at
the Supreme Court in the 1984 Term, I had the honor of taking Amy,
by then in middle school, on a grand tour of the Court — an imposing
marble palace she had never entered but whose geography she knew
by heart. I had gotten to know Amy and her family when my son and
Amy were in the same nursery school. Amy’s parents had not
brought ten-year-old Amy to the Court for the oral argument in 1982
because of the media circus. By the time Amy visited me at the
Court, her family had moved to a school district that agreed she
needed access to a sign language interpreter. Amy already knew
every detail of the courtroom — she pointed out the lectern where
her lawyer stood and she ran behind bench, calling out the names of
each justice as she passed his or her chair. She was surprised to find
that the floor of the “highest court in the land” (as the clerks
nicknamed the basketball court tucked under the roof of the building)
was made of wood. She had thought it too would be made of marble.
Amy went on to earn her doctorate at the University of Wisconsin,
and she is currently an Associate Professor and Coordinator of the
American Sign Language Program in Modern Languages and
Literatures at California State University, East Bay.70
This is a story about a deaf girl, not about the black boys that
Professor Dowd chooses as her protagonists.71 But Amy’s story is still
relevant to a book about developmental equality. It provides an
example of how the answer to “how much is enough?” can change as
societies evolve and as formerly excluded children write their own
stories. Amy and her peers — the first generation of children to
benefit from a right to education — have changed the debate. Thanks
to their stories, the children we once referred to as disabled are
increasingly seen as differently abled. Their story is part of a broader
social movement for children’s liberty and equality that is integrally
related to the advancement of children’s rights as human rights. Dr.

69. Id. at 202–03.
70. Faculty Profile for Amy June Rowley, CAL. ST. UNIV., E. BAY,
https://www.csueastbay.edu/directory/profiles/mll/rowleyamy-june.html
[https://perma.cc/CRL4-3J9R] (last visited September 4, 2019).
71. Disability is a form of diversity, but it is not the same as race, gender, and
other socially constructed differences. “The complex, variable, and contingent nature
of disability demands different approaches and different remedies than those apt for
other identity markers.” Margaret Winzer & Kas Mazurek, Diversity, Difference, and

Disability: Conceptual Contradictions and Present Practice in Inclusive Schooling for
Students with Disabilities, 4 INT’L DIALOGUES EDUC. 225, 225 (2017).

2020]

REIMAGINING EQUALITY THROUGH THE LENS OF HUMAN RIGHTS367

Margaret A. Winzer, in her history of special education, traces the
origins of the modern special education movement to the period of
the French enlightenment.72 “The phenomenal growth of special
education in the latter half of the eighteenth century was part of a
wider movement that involved the abolition of social classes, the
establishment of a just society, and the accession to full human rights
of all members of that society.”73 Despite setbacks like Amy’s early
Supreme Court defeat, Amy and her peers have been freed to
demonstrate their own amazing capacities when liberated from
discrimination and its developmental effects. They are following in
the footsteps of children like Fredrick Douglass, Helen Keller, and
Willa Cather whose stories about liberty and equality I told in Hidden

in Plain Sight: The Tragedy of Children’s Rights from Ben Franklin to
Lionel Tate.74

Recently, the Supreme Court decided another Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) case turning on the definition of a
free appropriate public education.75 In Endrew F., a case involving an
autistic child, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had applied a de
minimis standard, based on the “some benefit” language of Rowley.76
Advocates feared that the current, far more conservative, Supreme
Court might decide a split among the circuits by endorsing the Tenth
Circuit’s narrow standard.77 In a unanimous decision written by Chief
Justice Roberts, the Court found that “de minimis progress” was too
low a bar.78 Instead, in order “[t]o meet its substantive obligation
under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to
enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s

72. MARGARET A. WINZER, THE HISTORY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION: FROM
ISOLATION TO INTEGRATION 5 (1993).
73. Id. As Professor Dorothy Roberts points out, the Enlightenment notoriously
excluded enslaved people of color from its social justice movement. DOROTHY
ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RECREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 28–32 (2011).
74. WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN, supra note 14, at 51, 159, 180.
75. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. School Dist. Re-1, 137 S. Ct. 988,
991 (2017) (defining “free appropriate public education”).
76. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329,
1340 (10th Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017), remanded to and vacated sub
nom Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 694 F. App’x 654
(10th Cir. 2017).
77. See, e.g., Brief for Children’s Law Center et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 137 S. Ct. 988
(2017) (No. 15-827).
78. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001.
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circumstances.”79 It further clarified that a child’s “educational
program must be appropriately ambitious in light of his
circumstances, just as advancement from grade to grade is
appropriately ambitious for most children in the regular classroom.
The goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to meet
challenging objectives.”80 This was not a complete victory for
developmental equality. The Court avoided explicitly overruling
Rowley, and it rejected the argument that an IEP must “provide a
child with a disability opportunities to achieve academic success,
attain self-sufficiency, and contribute to society that are substantially
equal to the opportunities afforded children without disabilities.”81
But its endorsement of ambitious individualized educational plans
with challenging objectives appropriate to the specific child’s
circumstances was a far cry from Rowley’s anemic “some benefit.”82
V. TRANSFORMING THE INTRUSIVE STATE INTO THE RESPONSIVE
STATE
Dowd’s fourth point begins with the question: “[C]an the intrusive
state become a responsive state?”83 This point is well taken, and my
answer to the question is “Yes, it can!”
The term “intrusive state” represents an accurate picture of
contemporary U.S. relationships between the state and many families,
especially those families in greatest need of support. Despite the
explicit goals of protecting children, our child protection systems are
highly punitive.84 In representing poor parents and children, an
attorney’s primary goal is often simply to get the state out of their
client’s life.85 In cases of abuse and neglect, jurisdiction over the
family is established through a finding of “dependency,” which can

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1002.
Id. at 1000.
Id. at 1001.
Id.
Dowd, supra note 8, at 250.
See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD
WELFARE (2002); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Making Poor Mothers Fungible: The
Privatization of Foster Care, in CHILD CARE AND INEQUALITY: RE-THINKING

CAREWORK FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH (Francesca M. Cancian et al. eds., 2002),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=305882 [https://perma.cc/3RM2-BFV5].
85. See generally Kathleen A. Bailie, The Other “Neglected” Parties in Child

Protective Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of Lawyers Who Help
Them, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285 (1998).
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trigger a cascade of negative consequences.86 “The role of the
parent’s attorney during the jurisdiction trial resembles that of the
defense attorney in a criminal case.”87 They prioritize defeating the
state’s attempts to “help” because state intervention so often results
in tearing families apart rather than building them up.88 Americans
have been so thoroughly indoctrinated in the belief that relationships
between government and the “private” family are inherently
antagonistic, that it has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. In a major
Catch-22, “coercive” intervention is often a prerequisite to accessing
services, because only when the state can justify piercing the shell of
family privacy does its intervention trigger eligibility. Under typical
child protection statutes, in order for a court to mandate that the state
provide support services to a family, it must first find that the child is
“dependent,” meaning lacking proper parental care and supervision.89
In addition, when a child is declared “dependent,” a statutory clock
starts ticking requiring the state to initiate a termination of parental
rights unless the parent has succeeded in correcting the problem that
brought the state into the family’s private space.90 Often these
problems are beyond the parent’s control, such as lack of housing, or
are impossible to accomplish within the statutory time frame, such as
recovery from addiction. Not surprisingly, the result of these punitive
interventions is deep distrust of government. This distrust is the byproduct of government’s repeated failure to treat families with dignity
and respect. And that failure of respect is based on the presumption

86. See, e.g., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., THE JUVENILE DEPENDENCY COURT
YOU:
A
GUIDE
FOR
PARENTS
9
(2014),
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/juvenile-dependency-court-and-you.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FP9B-KGNJ].
87. Vivek Sankaran, Representing Parents in Child Welfare Cases, in CHILD
WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE
AGENCIES IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY CASES 579–615 (D. Duquette &
A. Haralambie eds., 2010).
88. See Bailie, supra note 85, at 2286.
89. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 (1986). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE
NEGLECT
(2019),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/define.pdf
AND
[https://perma.cc/UYE7-6CK8]. This language is typical of the phrases used in child
welfare statutes to define a child who is “dependent” and therefore within the
jurisdiction of the state or local child welfare agency. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 1511-311 (2014).
90. See generally David Herring, The Adoption and Safe Families Act — Hope
and Its Subversion, 34 FAM. L. Q. 329 (2000); Adrienne Whitt-Woosley & Ginny
Sprang, When Rights Collide: A Critique of the Adoption and Safe Families Act
from a Justice Perspective, 93 CHILD WELFARE 111 (2014).
AND
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that, in order to qualify for government services, the family must
already have failed.91
On the other hand, my research in Italy over the past decade
suggests the possibility of a very different relationship between the
state and the family.92 In every village, town or city I visited, small
automobiles labeled “Servizi Sociali” (social services) were a common
sight. These cars are used by government health care and social
service workers. Their job is to make the rounds of their community,
delivering oxygen tanks to the elderly, physical therapy and education
services to ill children and disabled or convalescent adults, and a wide
range of voluntary in-home medical and social supports that are free
of charge and free of stigma. Italy’s national health care system
works relatively seamlessly in partnership with social services,
generally without resort to coercive tactics. The same is true for
situations involving delinquent children. Under Italy’s juvenile justice
system, when a child under age 14 gets into trouble it is treated as a
public health problem calling for provision of mental health and
support services to the child and family. Criminal acts by youths aged
14 to 18 also trigger appointment of a team to identify appropriate
family and community services, education, and rehabilitation.
Detention of minors in locked facilities is a last resort, only
considered appropriate when all other avenues have been tried and
have failed.93 Termination of parental rights in cases of abuse or
neglect has also been a last resort. There have been cases involving
unnecessary removals, but they tend to trigger fierce public outcry.94

91. DANIEL L. HATCHER, THE POVERTY INDUSTRY, THE EXPLOITATION OF
AMERICA’S MOST VULNERABLE CITIZENS (2016); ROBERTS, supra note 84.
92. From 2007 to 2019, I conducted a longitudinal, comparative study of systems
of child protection, health care, juvenile justice, and family and child supports in Italy
and the United States I describe and compare the two systems in my book The
Ecology of Childhood, supra note 15.
93. Sayali Himanshu Bapat & Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Is There Justice for

Juveniles in the United States, India, and Italy?: Towards a Framework for
Transnational Comparisons, in THE FUTURE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: PROCEDURE AND

PRACTICE FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 37 (Tamar R. Birckhead & Solange
Mouthann eds., 2016).
94. One such case, described in The Ecology of Childhood, involved a toddler
whose mother had been deemed to have constructively abandoned him during a
period when she was heavily involved with drugs. As a response to public outcry, he
was allowed to remain with his mother in a therapeutic community that accepted
family units. Another example of public outrage is the national scandal that erupted
in July 2019 over allegations of inappropriate removals of children in Reggio Emilia.
Alessandro Fulloni, Bibbiano, Quattro Bambini Tornano Dai Genitori Naturali,
CORRIERE
DELLA
SERA
(July
24,
2019),
https://www.corriere.it/cronache/19_luglio_23/bibbiano-quattro-bambini-tornano-
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In the case of Italy and under the CRC framework, the state is viewed
as a partner in meeting children’s needs rather than as an adversary.
This is in stark contrast to the child welfare system currently in place
in the United States. But Italy and other countries that have
embraced children’s rights as human rights can give us hope that
change at the national level is possible.
VI. THE ROLE OF GRASSROOTS CHANGE
Dowd’s fourth comment continues:
If the broad legislative solutions at the federal [level] such as I have
sketched here are not possible because the idea of the responsive
state is [not] embraced, or is deeply problematic, then other ways to
accomplish this have to be devised. This suggests solutions geared
toward facilitating grassroots, nongovernmental change rather than
centralized federal programs.95

I agree with Dowd that there are many other ways to effect change
than in Washington, D.C. However, drawing upon lessons learned
during the process of implementation of the CRC, I would argue that
advocacy at the regional and grassroots level should not be viewed as
a fallback position but as integrally related to the success of Dowd’s
New Deal.
Dowd’s ambitious project calls for action at every level, not only at
the federal level. This strategy has been essential to the spread of
children’s rights in nations around the globe. In the 30 years since the
CRC’s entry into force in 1990, many scholars, governments, and
NGOs have documented best practices for winning support for the
CRC’s innovative principles. These practices have been applied in a
wide variety of local contexts, in the European Union, Africa, Asia,
the Americas, and Australia and New Zealand.96 In my book The
Ecology of Childhood, I explore how the new and potentially
controversial principles of the CRC were “domesticated” in the best

genitori-naturali-ecbb0f06-ad31-11e9-aafc-ff288f0f153c.shtml?refresh_ce-cp
[https://perma.cc/Y7ZG-ZF5J] (children’s court returns four children to their homes
after police investigation finds irregularities in documents submitted by psychologist
and foster care agency).
95. Dowd, supra note 8, at 250–51.
96. See generally UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, NEW ZEALAND
CHILDREN’S
COMMISSIONER,
https://www.occ.org.nz/childrens-rights-andadvice/uncroc/ [https://perma.cc/38VW-GPLQ] (last visited Jan. 31, 2020) (discussing
how New Zealand and Australia have incorporated the CRC); About Children’s
Rights, AUSTRALIAN HUM. RTS. COMMISSION, https://www.humanrights.gov.au/ourwork/childrens-rights/about-childrens-rights
[https://perma.cc/86SY-5LJQ]
(last
visited Jan. 31, 2020) (same).
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sense of the word in the laws of Italy and Wales, and in many other
nations of the European Union.97 Success depended on a broadbased public education effort — which is an integral part of the CRC
scheme since the CRC has many articles requiring education of
children and the public concerning the rights of the child — and
mobilization of support from NGOs, opinion makers, industry,
nonprofits, and community-based organizations.98
In addition, much can be learned by exploring American history
regarding the process of entrenchment of rights in political culture
and popular imagination. How did Roosevelt’s New Deal generate
regional and local support? Through what process did Medicare and
Social Security become so deeply ingrained in the American
experience that they are now referred to as the “third rail” of politics
— meaning that if an unwary politician dares to touch them she can
expect to die a swift and painful death? More recently, how did
LGBTQ families go from being ostracized, closeted, and criminalized
to achieving widespread visibility and support? It would not have
happened without changes at the grassroots, nongovernmental level.
Here is a story that powerfully illustrates the role of personal
experience in promoting appreciation of rights. Thirty years ago,
Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell cast the deciding vote upholding
criminal penalties for consensual sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick.99
At the time, he remarked to his fellow justices that he bore no animus
towards “homosexuals” and did not think he had ever met one.100 In
fact, many of his law clerks over the years had been LGBTQ,
including during the year when Bowers was decided. He was a kind
and caring individual who loved his law clerks as if they were his
children. As news of his comment spread around the Court, his gay
clerks decided to come out to him. He later stated that he regretted
his vote and would have voted differently. Hearts as well as minds
are opened when we can see other people’s children as our own.101

97. WOODHOUSE, ECOLOGY, supra note 15, at 225–59, 290–93.
98. Id. at 289–96; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3.
99. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197–98 (1986).
100. Linda Greenhouse, Black Robes Don’t Make the Justice, But the Rest of the
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
4,
2002),
Closet
Just
Might,
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/04/us/black-robes-don-t-make-the-justice-but-therest-of-the-closet-just-might.html [https://perma.cc/VZ7F-8V5M].
101. My own personal experience with Justice Powell confirms this story. In the
1984 term, two years before Bowers, I clerked for Justice O’Connor. That year, two
of Powell’s four law clerks were gay. Justice Powell was clearly oblivious. I will never
forget him introducing me to the partner of a female clerk during a reception in the
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VII. MOVING BEYOND THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DICHOTOMY
Professor Dowd’s fifth and final concern is presented as “a
corollary” to her question about the intrusive/responsive state. She
asks, “can we imagine supporting families and parents instead of
privatizing responsibility, or explaining or blaming families for
structural inequalities?”102 Dowd continues, “[u]nder the guise of
respecting families we have made privacy the support for inequality.
Is our commitment to equality strong enough to support all families
because they are essential to children?”103
Dowd’s comments about the pernicious effects of the publicprivate dichotomy ring true, as do her concerns about the possibility
of transformation. She is pointing out the pitfalls and shoals that lie
ahead. In the following Section, I will address her underlying
question: How do we transform a culture from one that idolizes
autonomy and condemns vulnerability to one that honors
vulnerability and prizes solidarity?
First, as Dowd agrees, we must stop demonizing vulnerability and
start accepting it as the most fundamental and inevitable aspect of the
human experience. The work of our Emory colleague Martha
Albertson Fineman and her Vulnerability and the Human Condition
Initiative is leading the way in accomplishing that transformation.104
Fineman urges that, far from marginalizing vulnerability as a form of
individual failure, we should accept it as a sign of our common
humanity and intrinsic value.105 She calls for a responsive state that is
committed to mitigating vulnerability and building resiliency for all its
members including children.106 Fineman’s initiative has grown,

justices’ dining room: “Barbara, have you met Mary’s friend Jane?” (I am using
pseudonyms). I replied that I had. We law clerks all knew that Jane and Mary had
long been a committed couple. He went on, “Did you know that Jane took a leave of
absence from her teaching position and moved all the way to Washington, D.C. to
help Mary during her clerkship? Now isn’t that a true friend!” Should I have
corrected Justice Powell’s misimpression instead of smiling at his naiveté? I often
wonder if it would have made a difference.
102. Dowd, supra note 8, at 251.
103. Id.
104. Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable in Law
and Politics, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR
LAW AND POLITICS (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013)
(Fineman’s initiative has grown during the decade since its inception into a
movement with global impact); see also DOWD, supra note 13, at 84–85;
WOODHOUSE, ECOLOGY, supra note 15, at 28, 285.
105. Fineman, supra note 104, at 16.
106. Id. at 24–27.
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during the decade since its inception, into an international movement
with global impact.107
Second, reimagining equality for children calls for the ecological
approach to understanding child development.108 This is an essential
tool in breaking down the artificial divide between public and private
spheres. Pioneered by social scientist Urie Bronfenbrenner, the
ecological model, which Dowd extolls and applies in her work, allows
us to see children’s development in social context.109 Instead of
imagining the child and her family in isolation from the rest of society,
we see family and child as embedded in a matrix of intersecting
microsystems (for example, family, neighborhood, school, faith
community, peer group) that constitute the intimate (not private)
spaces in which they live their lives.110 In the ecological model, these
core spaces are encircled by rings of ecosystems.111 These are places
where the child may rarely go but which powerfully affect her wellbeing (such as the parent’s workplace, the labor and economic
markets, the healthcare system, the justice system, and the housing
markets).112 Surrounding and permeating the child’s world is the
macrosystem, that climate of ideas, values, prejudices and powers that
reaches every level of the society.113 Just as water permeates the
natural environment, so the macrosystem nourishes or poisons the
child’s environment. As this model reveals, the biggest challenge to
children’s developmental equality is reforming the American
macrosystem. This is no easy task. Our macrosystem has long been
dominated by unrestrained capitalism, individualism, and

107. Vulnerability and the Human Condition Initiative, EMORY UNIV.,
http://web.gs.emory.edu/vulnerability/index.html
[https://perma.cc/A7DG-DSKT]
(last visited Jan. 31, 2020).
108. WOODHOUSE, ECOLOGY, supra note 15, at 15–20; see also WOODHOUSE,
HIDDEN, supra note 14, at 15–28; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A World Fit for
Children Is a World Fit for Everyone: Ecogenerism, Feminism and Vulnerability, 46
HOUS. L. REV. 817, 821–22 (2009) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Ecogenerism, Feminism
and Vulnerability]; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Race, Culture, Class and the Myth
of Crisis: An Ecogenerist Perspective on Child Welfare, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 519,
529–32 (2007) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Ecogenerist Perspective on Child Welfare];
DOWD, supra note 13, at 58–60.
109. URIE BRONFENRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 67 (1979)
(discussing how events occurring in a child’s environment shape his or her
development).
110. Woodhouse, Ecogenerism, Feminism and Vulnerability, supra note 108, at
822–23.
111. Id. at 822–23.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 823–24.
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materialism, and it continues to be poisoned by racism, sexism,
violence and entrenched hierarchy.
But the tradition of transformation is also entrenched in our social
and constitutional history. Many hierarchies formerly viewed as
normal and natural have crumbled in the face of constitutional
challenges. The constitution itself, despite what some might argue, is
not immune to change. To quote the Notorious RBG, writing in
United States v. Virginia in 1996, “A prime part of the history of our
Constitution is the story of the extension of constitutional rights and
protections to people once ignored or excluded.”114 As Ginsburg
explains, the American story of change has “continued as our
comprehension of ‘We the People’ expanded.”115 At the time of the
VMI decision, the story of childrens’ emerging rights was already
reflected in precedents rejecting discrimination against children of
minority races116 and children born to unmarried parents.117 In the
two decades since the VMI decision, this process of change has
continued. We have acknowledged that application of the death
penalty or life in prison without possibility of parole infringes on the
rights of children to be protected from cruel and unusual
punishments.118 And we have recognized that discrimination against
same sex marriage unjustly punishes children growing up in gay and
lesbian families.119 In each of these cases, emerging human rights
have been cited by the Court and in amicus briefs, not as binding
authority but as evidence of global transformations.
In The Constitutionalization of Children’s Rights: Incorporating
Emerging Human Rights into Constitutional Doctrine, published
shortly after Justice Ginsburg’s VMI opinion, I trace the path by
which human rights, even in the absence of ratification of a specific
treaty, can become incorporated into our domestic system of
constitutional law.120 I compare the provisions of the newly minted
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa recognizing children’s
rights (provisions that mirror the CRC, which South Africa had
formally ratified) with the more gradual story of children’s emerging
114. U.S. v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 547 n.21 (1996) (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 557.
116. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
117. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68 (1968).
118. See generally Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
119. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); United States v.
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
120. Woodhouse, Constitutionalization, supra note 7, at 3–5 (1999).
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rights as reflected in the process of constitutional interpretation that
Ginsburg highlights in VMI.
I used the case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County as my example
of a disconnect between children’s U.S. constitutional rights and
children’s human rights.121 That case involved some of the most
problematic principles of U.S. constitutional law — the dichotomies
between public and private and between state action and inaction.122
The question was whether the state child protection agency could be
held liable for its failure to protect a child named Joshua.123 Despite
evidence of abuse, the state had released the child to the custody of
his father, but under supervision by county protective services.124
Ignoring cogent evidence of risk to the child, the agency failed to act
to protect him.125 Writing for a majority of six, Justice Rehnquist
concluded that a state has no affirmative duty under the Due Process
Clause to protect a child, even one under its supervision, against
“private” violence.126
As Justice Blackmun famously lamented:
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible,
bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by
respondents, who placed him in a dangerous predicament and who
knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially nothing
except, as the Court revealingly observes . . . “dutifully recorded
these incidents in [their] files.” It is a sad commentary upon
American life, and constitutional principles — so full of late of
patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about “liberty and justice
for all,” that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out
the remainder of his life profoundly retarded.127

Many years ago, one of my constitutional law students surprised
me by challenging my statement that children are nowhere mentioned
in the U.S. Constitution. Pointing to the Preamble, he argued,
“Doesn’t it say right here in black and white that its purpose is ‘to
Secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity?’” I
would argue that my student got it right. The framers chose those
words to instruct us in our duty to use the document they created for

121. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199–200
(1989).
122. Id. at 205 (discussing state action and inaction).
123. Id. at 191.
124. Id. at 192.
125. Id. at 192–93.
126. Id. at 197–98.
127. Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).

2020]

REIMAGINING EQUALITY THROUGH THE LENS OF HUMAN RIGHTS377

posterity as well as for the specific ends they had in their limited field
of view. They believed in liberty as a value in search of perfection,
not as a static definition of existing rights. Professor Dowd has shown
us the way as we continue to explore the open textured concepts of
liberty, equality, and dignity as applied to persons of all ages and
capacities. As I wrote 20 years ago:
[R]ecognition of emerging rights depends on a robust belief among
judges and the people in the legitimacy of judicial interpretation.
Judges must approach the written document as a “living” thing, not
only open to interpretation, but positively designed to grow through
judicial interpretation. Neither the amendment process nor the
democratic process alone can provide meaningful avenues for
growth and renewal when the emerging claims are those of isolated
minorities or even of numerical majorities who have been
systematically excluded from power.128

My faith in the Supreme Court as an engine of progress in human
rights has frayed since I wrote those words. Its stature as an
independent coequal branch has been undermined by partisan efforts
by the Republican-controlled Senate and Executive Branch to block
the Court’s normal process of renewal and to pack both the Supreme
Court and the federal judiciary with “originalists” committed to
rolling back constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
As I write, the Trump administration is also mounting a new attack
on the very concept of evolving human rights. On July 8, 2019, the
State Department announced the creation of a “human rights
advisory panel” to examine the role of human rights in American
foreign policy.129 According to the top Democrat on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, the argument for a human rights panel
is absurd, especially in light of the fact that the Trump administration
“has taken a wrecking ball to America’s global leadership on
promoting fundamental rights across the world.”130 As the British
paper The Guardian reports:
[Secretary of State Mike] Pompeo said that the commission’s goal is
to exclude “ad hoc” rights. While he does not elaborate on what “ad

128. Woodhouse, Constitutionalization, supra note 7, at 51.
129. Edward Wong & Eileen Sullivan, New Human Rights Panel Raises Fears of a
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
8,
2019),
Narrowing
U.S.
Advocacy,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/08/us/politics/state-human-rights.html
[https://perma.cc/MFP9-GQM6].
130. Id. (quoting Sen. Robert Menendez).
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hoc” rights are, he attacks “politicians and bureaucrats” who “create
new rights”, and many of the members of the commission appear to
have been selected in no small part because they also want to roll
back human rights.131

I expect that children’s rights will be among the “ad hoc” human
rights under attack. This is why I am extremely grateful to Professor
Dowd for Reimagining Equality and for her recently published and
totally brilliant articulation of a constitutional argument for children’s
rights.132
While my faith in the Supreme Court is shaken, I still have faith in
the American people’s support for the proposition that the
Constitution was written for the ages and will continue to evolve. It
will be up to the young people — my children’s and grandchildren’s
generation — to keep up the fight for human rights. Unfortunately,
our young people have a lot on their plates right now.133 Given the
existential crisis of climate change looming over our nation and our
planet, it may seem as if worrying about equality and children’s rights
is like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. I would propose a
slightly different metaphor. Our collective survival depends on
acknowledging our vessel’s vulnerability, seeing the iceberg we are
approaching before it is too late, and providing seaworthy lifeboats
for all children, not just the richest and most privileged.

131. Michael H. Fuchs, Donald Trump Is on an Orwellian Mission to Redefine
GUARDIAN
(July
18,
2019),
Rights,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/18/trump-pompeo-humanrights-un-orwellian-mission-redefine [https://perma.cc/DEW5-4JYQ].
132. Nancy Dowd, Children’s Equality Rights: Every Child’s Right to Develop to
Their Full Capacity, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
133. See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, 2020 WL 254149, at *5 (9th Cir. Jan. 17,
2020) (denying Article III standing to group of young people alleging U.S.
government violated substantive due process, equal protection, the Ninth
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